Under English law, which was in effect when the United States Constitution was ratified, there were several types of treason. Of these, the Constitution adopted only two: war and enmity. The types of betrayal that included (or imagined) the death of the king, certain types of falsifications, and finally fornication with women in the royal family that could question the lineage of royal successors were omitted. James Wilson wrote the original draft of this section, and he was involved as defense attorney for some accused of treason against the Patriot cause. Both forms of treason are derived from the English Treason Act of 1351. Joseph Story wrote in his comments on the Constitution of the United States by the framers of the Constitution: A major omission is that, although Article 1 provides that the federal judiciary extends to the “laws of the United States,” it also does not provide that it extends to the laws of several states or states. In turn, the Judiciary Act of 1789 and subsequent statutes never granted the U.S. Supreme Court the power to review state supreme court decisions on purely constitutional matters. It is this silence that has silently made the state supreme courts the last interpreters of the common law in their respective states. They were free to depart from English precedents and from each other in the vast majority of legal matters that had never been part of federal law by the Constitution, and the U.S. Supreme Court could do nothing, as it would eventually concede in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins (1938). On the other hand, other English-speaking federations such as Australia and Canada have never adopted the Erie doctrine. That is, their highest courts have always had the power to impose a uniform national common law on all lower courts and have never adopted the strong American distinction between federal and state law. You seem. to consider judges as the final arbiters in all constitutional cases; In fact, a very dangerous doctrine that would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our judges are just as honest as other men, and nothing more. They share with others the same passions for partying, for the power and privilege of their bodies. Their power [is] all the more dangerous because they are in power for life, and not, like other civil servants, responsible for electoral control. The Constitution did not establish such a unified court, knowing full well that its members would become despots in all the hands they entrusted, with the corruption of the time and the Party.
He has made all ministries smarter in themselves, more equal and sovereign.  The Constitution is silent when it comes to judges of courts that have been abolished. The Judiciary Act of 1801 increased the number of courts to allow Federalist President John Adams to appoint a number of Federalist judges before Thomas Jefferson took office. When Jefferson became president, Congress abolished several of these courts and made no provision for the judges of these courts. The Court Code of 1911 abolished the circuit district and transferred the authority and jurisdiction of the circuit courts to the district courts. In certain types of cases, the courts referred to in Article III may exercise jurisdiction over the courts referred to in Article 1. In Murray`s Leasesee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. (59 U.S. (18 Wie.) 272 (1856)), the Court held that “there are questions of law concerning public rights which may be presented in such a manner as to enable the judiciary to answer them” and which are subject to review by an Article III tribunal. Later, in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.
(279 U.S. 438 (1929)), the Court stated that the tribunals referred to in Article 1 “may be established as special courts to consider and decide various questions arising between the Government and others which, by their nature, do not require a judicial decision and are nevertheless likely to be so”.  Other cases, such as bankruptcy, have been classified as not having been the subject of a judicial decision and can therefore be brought before the courts referred to in Article 1. Similarly, several courts in the District of Columbia, which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, are Article I courts, not Article III courts. This article was expressly extended by the United States to the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. Congress by Federal Act 89-571, 80 Stat. 764, signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966. As a result, the United States Territorial Court in Puerto Rico, established in 1900, was transformed into an Article III Federal Court.
Since treason can be committed against the United States, the authority of the United States should be empowered to punish it. But since new and man-made treason was the great driving force with which violent factions, the natural descendants of free government, generally inflicted their alternating brutality, the Convention resisted with great judgment a barrier to this particular danger by inserting a constitutional definition of the crime and establishing the evidence necessary for its conviction. and to prevent Congress, even in its sanction, from extending the consequences of guilt beyond the person of its perpetrator. Often, a court invokes a modest power over a case to determine whether it has jurisdiction and, therefore, the word “power” is not necessarily synonymous with the word “jurisdiction.”   The penalty for high treason should not be condemned as “corruption of blood or confiscation except during the person`s lifetime.” The descendants of a person convicted of high treason could not, as they were under English law, be considered “tainted” by the treason of their ancestor. The Constitution states that judges “shall perform their duties with good conduct.” The term “good behaviour” is interpreted to mean that judges may serve for the rest of their lives, although they may voluntarily resign or retire. A judge may also be impeached and convicted by order of Congress (hence the term good conduct); This has happened fourteen times. Three other justices, Mark W. Delahay, George W. English, and Samuel B. Kent, chose to resign rather than impeach. This conclusion in no way implies the superiority of the judiciary over the legislative power. It only presupposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and that if the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, is contrary to the will of the people proclaimed in the Constitution, judges should be governed by the Constitution and not by the former.
They should regulate their decisions by basic laws and not by non-fundamental ones.  It can carry no weight to say that, under the pretext of abomination, the courts can substitute their own pleasure for the constitutional intentions of Parliament. This could also be the case with two conflicting laws; Or it might as well happen in every decision on a single law. The courts must explain the meaning of the law; And if they were inclined to exercise will rather than judgment, the consequence would also be that their pleasure would be replaced by that of the legislature.